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The proposed Universal Benefit is one of the coalition’s flagship policies, aiming to
consolidate benefits and tax credits into one single payment, thereby reducing complexity
and administration costs significantly. Claire Annesley and Fran Bennett of the
Women’s Budget Group argue that a move to a single benefit would have
disproportionate effects on women in low income families by reinforcing the ‘male
breadwinner’ model, reducing their ability to budget and access to an income of their own.
The Welfare Reform Bill 2011 sets out the Coalition government’s plans to introduce a
Universal Credit from 2013, combining out-of-work, in-work and housing benefits/tax
credits into a single means-tested benefit. The government describes this as simplifying
benefits and increasing the incentives for claimants to move into (any) paid work, thereby
promoting a culture of employment. The Women’s Budget Group (WBG), however, has
concerns about how Universal Credit will affect progress towards gender equality.
Universal Credit amalgamates previously existing benefits/tax credits which have varying
purposes, and are claimed by and paid to different people (sometimes individuals rather
than couples), at different intervals, and withdrawn at different rates in order. It is
proposed that Universal Credit will be claimed and owned by couples jointly, usually paid
in full to one partner, probably monthly, and withdrawn at the same rate across all
elements. This radical change raises issues which have gender implications.
Disincentives for second earners
While the Universal Credit will in many cases increase the financial incentive for one
person in couple households to move into some form of employment, incentives for many second earners will
be weakened in comparison to the current situation, as both government and independent evaluations
confirm. This will particularly affect women as they are more likely to be the second earners in households
and they usually earn less than men and do more informal caring work. Worryingly, the Government finds
‘that any such risk of decreased work incentives for women in couples is justified.’ (p. 19). The WBG’s
concern is that this could mark the start of a return to a ‘male breadwinner model’ in which men do paid work
and women stay at home to look after children and other dependants.
Managing household budgets
Currently families often get a mix of different benefits/tax credits, and child tax credit is paid to the ‘main
carer’. Collapsing most of these into a single payment (probably paid monthly) to ‘mimic wages’, and paying it
in most cases to one partner in couples, will affect gender equality in two ways.
For many low-income families, money often runs out before the end of the week and a single monthly
payment will make it harder for such families to budget. This will affect women in particular because
they tend to manage the budget and do day-to-day spending.
The evidence is that when money is short, women often go without: women tend to be the ‘shock
absorbers’ of poverty. Couple households will have to nominate who receives the payment, and it is
likely to be split only in emergencies. This will be likely to affect many women’s access to an individual
income for children and for themselves. There is no guarantee that money is distributed fairly within
households.
We are seriously concerned about proposals which concentrate financial resources and power into the
hands of one person, especially where this may exacerbate existing gender inequalities.
Financial Independence and Stable Relationships
The approach that the coalition government is adopting here indicates an ignorance or wilful blindness to
gendered power inequalities and intra-household distribution. These are well-researched and long-
established issues in the fields of policy making, politics and economics, and it is worrying that the UK
government is not engaging with this work. Facilitating individual access to income should not be seen as a
threat to family stability and mutuality, but instead as having the potential to strengthen it.
Paying Universal Credit in total to one partner could undermine the government’s aim of encouraging
committed couple relationships, as it increases the risk involved in individuals’ decisions about family
formation.  Given joint assessment, joint claims and joint liability for Universal Credit, and the potential for the
whole of Universal Credit to be paid to the other partner, a significant leap of faith would be required to
contemplate life with a new partner. At the same time, the onus on claimants to report changes of
circumstances (such as a new partner) in a timely way will increase.
By and large, broader issues such as these are not captured in the gender section of the Universal Credit
Equality Impact Assessment. Individual financial security is a better basis for achieving flourishing
relationships, whereas financial dependence can put a strain on them; and more flexible gender roles are
more likely to result in family stability and equality within couples.
Yet some proposals in the Bill point instead towards greater economic dependence of one partner on the
other, and the reinforcement of a ‘male breadwinner’ model. In our view, this is not compatible with either the
government’s duties on equality or its other social goals.
A detailed analysis of the gendered impact of the Universal Credit can be found in written evidence to the
Select Committee Inquiry from Fran Bennett, Ruth Lister and Sue Himmelweit (for the WBG)
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmworpen/743/743we01.htm and WBG (2011)
Welfare Reform Bill: Women’s Budget Group Evidence to Public Bill Committee,
http://www.wbg.org.uk/RRB_Reports_6_3769269156.pdf
